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KIOBEL V. ROYAL DUTCH 
PETROLEUM: DELINEATING THE 
BOUNDS OF THE ALIEN TORT 
STATUTE 
TARA MCGRATH 
I. INTRODUCTION 
The Alien Tort Statute (ATS) has been deemed a “legal 
Lohengrin,”1 after the knight who mysteriously emerges on a swan-
drawn boat in the Richard Wagner opera—no one knows from where 
it came or for what purpose it appeared. The one-sentence statute 
simply states: “The district courts shall have original jurisdiction of 
any civil action by an alien for a tort only, committed in violation of 
the law of nations or a treaty of the United States.”2 Compounding 
problems, the ATS’s early history is sparse—after the first Congress 
passed the statute as part of the Judiciary Act of 1789, the statute lay 
largely dormant for almost 200 years.3 
In 1980 the statute was finally resurrected in the landmark case 
Filartiga v. Pena-Irala,4 in which the Second Circuit recognized an 
ATS claim for torture perpetrated under the color of official 
authority.5 Since then, ATS litigation has proliferated in federal courts, 
offering aliens redress for violations of customary international law 
 
 J.D. Candidate, 2014, Duke University School of Law. 
 1.  IIT v. Vencap, Ltd., 519 F.2d 1001, 1015 (2d Cir. 1975) (“This old but little used section 
is a kind of legal Lohengrin . . . no one seems to know whence it came.”). 
 2.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2012). 
 3.  See William R. Casto, The Federal Courts’ Protective Jurisdiction over Torts Committed 
in Violation of the Law of Nations, 18 CONN. L. REV. 467, 468 n.5 (1986) (noting two early court 
cases that did cite the ATS, but only as an alternative basis for jurisdiction over admiralty cases 
(citing Bolchos v. Darrel, 3 F. Cas. 810 (D.S.C. 1795) (No. 1607); Moxon v. The Fanny, 17 F. 
Cas. 942 (D. Pa. 1793) (No. 9895))). 
 4.  630 F.2d 876 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 5.  Id. at 878. It is indeterminate why the ATS was seldom utilized before Filartiga, though 
one reason may be the uncertainty surrounding the statute’s reach and application. See Tel-
Oren v. Libyan Arab Republic, 726 F.2d 774, 775 (D.C. Cir. 1984) (describing the ATS as “an 
area of law that cries out for clarification”). 
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(CIL), even when the alleged misconduct occurred abroad.6 Courts 
have generally assumed that the ATS encompasses extraterritorial 
claims, although the issue has not yet been definitively resolved by the 
Supreme Court.7 That very question—whether and under what 
circumstances the ATS allows federal courts to recognize 
extraterritorial causes of action for violations of CIL—is now before 
the Court in Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum.8 
In determining the scope of the ATS, the Court must strike a 
balance between ensuring that the United States does not become a 
haven for hostis humani generis—enemies of all mankind9—while 
preventing federal courts from infringing on the sovereignty of other 
nations. A reflection on the text and purpose of the statute, the 
common law of the era, and an Opinion written by Attorney General 
William Bradford, demonstrates that the ATS was intended to have 
an extraterritorial reach, and thus the Court should hold that the ATS 
does apply to causes of action arising on foreign soil. Moreover, in 
light of the limited claims that survive the standard set out in the 
Supreme Court’s first decision on the ATS, and the existing limiting 
doctrines available to courts, federal judges are equipped to address 
extraterritorial violations of CIL under the ATS while still respecting 
the sovereignty of any foreign nation implicated. 
II. FACTUAL BACKGROUND 
Plaintiffs are, or were, residents of the Ogoni region of Nigeria, 
where Shell Petroleum Development Company of Nigeria, Ltd. 
(SPDC) has been engaged in oil exploration and production since 
1958.10 In protest of the environmental degradation SPDC’s activities 
 
 6.  See generally Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736 (9th Cir. 2011) (considering a cause 
of action under the ATS for alleged violations of CIL occurring in Papau New Guinea); 
Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244 (2d Cir. 2009) 
(adjudicating a cause of action under the ATS for alleged violations of CIL arising in Sudan); 
Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776 (11th Cir. 2005) (deciding a cause of action under the ATS for 
alleged violations of CIL transpiring in Haiti). 
 7.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 738 (deciding an ATS claim on grounds 
other than lack of jurisdiction to hear an extraterritorial cause of action). 
 8.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., No. 10-1491 (U.S. argued Oct. 1, 2012); 
Petitioners’ Supplemental Opening Brief at 6, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491 
(U.S. June 6, 2012) [hereinafter Brief for Petitioners]. 
 9.  See Filartiga, 630 F.2d at 890 (“[F]or purposes of civil liability, the torturer has become 
like the pirate and slave trader before him hostis humani generis, an enemy of all mankind.”) 
(emphasis added). 
 10.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 123 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-1491). 
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caused, residents of the Ogoni region organized the Movement for 
the Survival of the Ogoni People.11 In response, the Sani Abanacha 
dictatorship engaged in widespread and systematic attacks against the 
Ogoni population, directed in particular at opponents of SPDC’s 
drilling activities.12 From 1993 through 1994, Nigerian military forces 
purportedly beat, arrested, raped, and even killed Ogoni people.13 
In 2002, Nigerian plaintiffs brought a putative class action suit in 
the United States District Court for the Southern District of New 
York, pursuant to the ATS, against oil company defendants.14 The 
defendants were Royal Dutch Petroleum Company and Shell 
Transport and Trading Company PLC, incorporated in the 
Netherlands and the United Kingdom respectively.15 Plaintiffs alleged 
Defendants enlisted the aid of the Nigerian government to oppress 
the resistance movement, acting through their subsidiary SPDC, and 
thereby aided and abetted violations of CIL by the Nigerian 
government.16 Specifically, Defendants allegedly “(1) provided 
transportation to Nigerian forces, (2) allowed their property to be 
utilized as a staging ground for attacks, (3) provided food for soldiers 
involved in the attacks, and (4) provided compensation to those 
soldiers.”17 Plaintiffs brought claims against Defendants for “aiding 
and abetting (1) extrajudicial killings; (2) crimes against humanity; (3) 
torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment; (4) arbitrary 
arrest and detention; (5) violation of the rights to life, liberty, security, 
and association; (6) forced exile; and (7) property destruction.”18 
Plaintiffs thus asserted a “foreign-cubed” ATS claim, one in which 
both the plaintiff and defendant were foreign to the jurisdiction in 
which the case was being adjudicated, and the alleged misconduct 
occurred abroad.19 Defendants twice moved to dismiss on the grounds 
that Plaintiffs’ claims were barred by the act of state doctrine20 and 
 
 11.  Id. 
 12.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 8, at 4. 
 13.  Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123. 
 14.  Id. at 123–24. 
 15.  Id. 
 16.  Id. at 123. 
 17.  Id. 
 18.  Id. 
 19.  See Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 794 (9th Cir. 2011) (Bea, J., concurring in 
part and dissenting in part) (defining a “foreign-cubed” ATS case as one in which “a foreign 
plaintiff [sues] a foreign defendant for alleged torts which occurred entirely on foreign soil”). 
 20.  See Underhill v. Hernandez, 168 U.S. 250, 252 (1897) (establishing the act of state 
doctrine by stating that “the courts of one country [shall] not sit in judgment on the acts of the 
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the doctrine of international comity,21 and that Plaintiffs failed to state 
a claim on which relief could be granted.22 The District Court 
dismissed several of Plaintiffs’ claims because they were not defined 
by CIL with the particularity required by Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain.23 
Yet the court refused to dismiss Plaintiffs’ claims of aiding and 
abetting arbitrary arrest and detention, crimes against humanity, and 
torture or cruel, inhuman, and degrading treatment.24 Instead, 
recognizing the importance of the alleged human rights violations and 
the difference of opinion among the courts regarding ATS litigation, 
the District Court certified its entire order for interlocutory appeal.25 
III. LEGAL BACKGROUND 
A. Initial Understanding of the ATS 
Two foreign relations clashes helped give rise to the ATS, both of 
which occurred on American soil: the attack of the Secretary of the 
French Legion in Philadelphia, dubbed the “Marbois Incident,” and 
the attack of a Dutch diplomat in New York.26 Congress feared that if 
federal courts were left without a legal remedy, the assault of a 
foreign ambassador could serve as a catalyst for war.27 The United 
 
government of another done within its own territory”). 
 21.  See Hilton v. Guyot, 159 U.S. 113, 164 (1895) (defining the doctrine of international 
comity as “the recognition which one nation allows within its territory to the legislative, 
executive, or judicial acts of another nation, having due regard both to international duty and 
convenience, and to the rights of its own citizens, or of other persons who are under the 
protection of its laws”). 
 22.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 456 F. Supp. 2d 457, 459–60 (S.D.N.Y. 2006), 
aff’d in part, rev’d in part, 621 F.3d 111 (2d Cir. 2010), cert granted, 132 S. Ct. 472 (2011) (No. 10-
1491). 
 23.  542 U.S. 692 (2004); Kiobel, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 463–68 (dismissing plaintiffs’ claims for 
aiding and abetting property destruction, forced exile, extrajudicial killing, and violations of the 
rights of life, liberty, security, and association). 
 24.  Kiobel, 456 F. Supp. 2d at 463–67. 
 25.  Id. at 467–68. 
 26.  See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 716–17 (noting that in response to the Continental Congress’s 
inability to deal with cases like the Marbois Incident, the Framers drafted Article III § 2 of the 
United States Constitution and the First Congress enacted the Judiciary Act, which included the 
ATS (citing Respublica v. De Longchamps, 1 U.S. 111 (1784); Casto, supra note 3, at 494 & 
n.152)); id. at 717 n.11 (describing the French minister plenipotentiary’s formal protest following 
the Marbois Incident as including a threat to leave Pennsylvania if the attacker was not 
satisfactorily brought to justice). 
 27.  See id. at 715 (2004); see also Filartiga v. Pena-Irala, 630 F.2d 876, 886 (2d Cir. 1980) 
(“[O]ne of the principal defects of the Confederation that our Constitution was intended to 
remedy was the central government’s inability to ‘cause infractions of treaties or of the law of 
nations, to be punished.” (quoting 1 FARRAND, RECORDS OF THE FEDERAL CONVENTION 19 
(Rev. ed. 1937) (Notes of James Madison))). 
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States Supreme Court affirmed: 
It was this narrow set of violations of the law of nations, admitting 
of a judicial remedy and at the same time threatening serious 
consequences in international affairs, that was probably on [the] 
minds of the men who drafted the ATS with its reference to tort.28 
The ATS, as enacted in the Judiciary Act of 1789, provided the 
new federal district courts with “cognizance, concurrent with the 
courts of the several States, or the circuit courts . . . of all causes where 
an alien sues for a tort only in violation of the law of nations or a 
treaty of the United States.”29 It was but “a grant of jurisdiction, not 
power to mold substantive law.”30 
Six years later, Attorney General William Bradford considered the 
possibility of prosecuting under the ATS American citizens who had 
“aided[] and abetted a French fleet in attacking [a] settlement” of 
British subjects off the coast of Sierra Leone.31 Specifically, American 
citizens were accused of participating in the “pillaging and destruction 
of property in Freetown.”32 The episode aroused a formal protest from 
Great Britain concerning the role American citizens played in the 
attack,33 and it was to these complaints that Bradford addressed his 
Opinion.34 Bradford appeared uncertain whether criminal liability 
could stand, but insisted: “[T]here can be no doubt that the company 
or individuals who have been injured by these acts of hostility have a 
 
 28.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 715. 
 29.  Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 1 Stat. 77. 
 30.  Sosa, 542 US at 713 (finding support for a reading of the statute as jurisdictional based 
on the use of the word “cognizance”) (emphasis added). 
 31.  Breach of Neutrality, 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 58 (1795); see Curtis A. Bradley, Attorney 
General Bradford’s Opinion and the Alien Tort Statute, 106 AM. J. INT’L L. 509, 518 & n.62 
(2012) (noting that David Newell and Peter Mariner were the two American citizens who 
allegedly participated in the attack). 
 32.  Bradley, supra note 31, at 520–21; see id. at 524 (detailing a memorial sent to Bradford 
complaining of the attack that described Newell as having “led a party of French soldiers in 
Freetown” and Mariner as having been “exceedingly active in promoting the pillage of 
Freetown” (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)). 
 33.  See Supplemental Brief for the United States as Amicus Curiae in Partial Support of 
Affirmance, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum at 9, No. 10-1491 (U.S. June 11, 2012) 
[hereinafter Brief for the United States] (noting Great Britain’s protest was inspired by a 
concern “that [American] citizens might engage in incidents that could embroil the young 
nation in war and jeopardize its status or welfare in the Westphalian system”) (citation 
omitted). 
 34.  Bradley, supra note 31, at 518–20 (stating that “Bradford’s opinion was a response to a 
specific set of complaints” as set out in a diplomatic note from Britain’s minister plenipotentiary 
in the United States and a memorial jointly written by “the acting governor of the Sierra Leone 
colony[] and . . . an agent of the proprietors of a slave-trading station” located near the attack). 
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remedy by a civil suit in the courts of the United States [under the 
ATS].”35 Most notably, the Opinion, when read in light of the 
diplomatic correspondence submitted to Bradford, demonstrates that 
the attack was not limited to the high seas and that Bradford was 
primarily concerned with the events that occurred on foreign land, in 
Freetown, Sierra Leone.36 
B. Filartiga to Sosa 
The “rarely-invoked” ATS finally emerged once more in Filartiga 
v. Pena-Irala, in which the Second Circuit held that whenever an 
alleged violator of international human rights law is “found and 
served with process by an alien within [American] borders, [the ATS] 
provides federal jurisdiction.”37 There, Paraguayan citizens brought 
suit against a former Paraguayan government official for wrongfully 
causing the death of their son while in Paraguay, though the 
defendant was served with process in the United States.38 The court 
construed the ATS “not as granting new rights to aliens, but simply as 
opening the federal courts for adjudication of the rights already 
recognized by international law.”39 Since then, ATS litigation has 
become increasingly widespread, and circuit courts have adjudicated 
these cases on much the same assumption as the Filartiga court: when 
personal jurisdiction is satisfied, and when the plaintiff alleges a civil 
claim for a violation of international law, the ATS provides federal 
jurisdiction.40 
In its first decision directly addressing the ATS, the Supreme 
Court in Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain seemed to agree with the reasoning 
 
 35.  1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59. 
 36.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 33, at 8 (“[Bradford] plainly knew that 
some of the conduct at issue occurred within the territory of Sierra Leone, and his reference to 
‘acts of hostility’ for which the ATS afforded a remedy could have been meant to encompass 
that conduct.”); Bradley, supra note 31, at 521 (“While it is conceivable that some of the actions 
in question could have constituted piracy . . . [t]he central focus of the materials before 
Bradford, and of his opinion, was on the conduct of [the American] citizens” in Freetown). 
 37.  630 F.2d 876, 878 (2d Cir. 1980). 
 38.  Id. at 878–79. 
 39.  Id. at 887. 
 40.  See, e.g., Presbyterian Church of Sudan v. Talisman Energy, Inc., 582 F.3d 244, 259 (2d 
Cir. 2009) (looking to international law to determine the circumstances in which aiders and 
abettors can be liable for violations of international human rights law); In re Estate of 
Ferdinand Marcos, Human Rights Litig., 25 F.3d 1467, 1475 (9th Cir. 1994) (finding it 
“unnecessary that international law provide a specific right to sue” so long as a “specific, 
universal, and obligatory” violation of international law is alleged). 
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in Filartiga.41 In Sosa, a Mexican citizen alleged that the Drug 
Enforcement Administration orchestrated his abduction from Mexico 
to the United States; the plaintiff brought claims under the ATS 
against the Mexican citizens who assisted in his abduction, the United 
States, and four DEA agents.42 The District Court awarded summary 
judgment and monetary damages to the plaintiff, and the Ninth 
Circuit affirmed.43 The Supreme Court reversed, holding that the ATS 
was a jurisdictional statute that “enabled federal courts to hear claims 
in a very limited category defined by the law of nations and 
recognized at common law,”44 and plaintiff’s claims did not fall within 
that category.45 
Specifically, the Court found that the ATS encompassed three 
violations of international law historically addressed by English 
criminal law and enumerated by famed legal commentator William 
Blackstone: “violation of safe conducts, infringement of the rights of 
ambassadors, and piracy.”46 Noting that international law had evolved 
following the ATS’s inception, the Court held that federal courts 
could recognize additional claims “based on the present-day law of 
nations” insofar as those laws rested on “norm[s] of international 
character accepted by the civilized world and defined with a 
specificity comparable to the features of the 18th-century paradigms” 
that Blackstone enumerated.47 
To determine which CIL claims can be brought under the ATS in 
the absence of a treaty, controlling executive or legislative act, or 
judicial decision, the Court suggested “cautiously” looking to such 
sources as “the customs and usages of civilized nations; and, as 
evidence of these, to the works of jurists and commentators.”48 The 
Court further directed that in determining “whether a norm is 
sufficiently definite to support a cause of action,” the lower court 
“should (and, indeed, inevitably must) . . . [consider] the practical 
consequences of making that cause available to litigants in the federal 
 
 41.  See 542 U.S. 692, 731 (2004) (noting that the position the Court was adopting had 
“been assumed by some federal courts for 24 years” since the time Filartiga was decided). 
 42.  Id. at 697–98. 
 43.  Alvarez-Machain v. United States, 266 F.3d 1045, 1064 (9th Cir. 2001). 
 44.  Sosa, 542 U.S. at 712. 
 45.  See id. at 738 (holding that the claims alleged by the plaintiff violated “no norm of 
[CIL] so well defined as to support the creation of a federal remedy”). 
 46.  Id. at 715 (citing 4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF 
ENGLAND 68 (1769)). 
 47.  Id. at 725. 
 48.  Id. at 733–34 (quoting The Paquete Habana, 175 U.S. 677, 700 (1900)). 
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courts.”49 Finally, the Court warned federal courts to proceed “with 
great caution” in light of the adverse foreign policy consequences 
when attempting to “craft remedies for the violation of new norms of 
international law.”50 
The Court thus created a two-part test for recognizing a cause of 
action under the ATS: (1) whether the claim is sufficiently defined 
and recognized under CIL to support a cause of action, and (2) 
whether a court should recognize a cause of action, taking into 
consideration the practical consequences of making that claim 
available to litigants in the federal courts. In holding as a threshold 
matter that the plaintiff did not satisfy the first part of the test, the 
Court was able to dispose of the case without having to define the 
broader scope of the statute.51 In Kiobel, the Court will have a second 
opportunity to consider the reach of the ATS. 
IV. HOLDING 
Hearing Kiobel on appeal, the Second Circuit reviewed the district 
court’s dismissal for failure to state a claim and the question of 
subject matter jurisdiction de novo.52 Adhering to its precedent and 
Sosa, the court looked to CIL “to determine both whether certain 
conduct leads to ATS liability and whether the scope of liability under 
the ATS extends to the defendant being sued.”53 A sharply divided 
court, without briefing or argument on the issue,54 dismissed the case 
for lack of subject matter jurisdiction because the ATS does not 
recognize a cause of action against a juridical defendant,55 finding that 
juridical entities are not subjects of CIL.56 In so holding, the court did 
 
 49.  Id. at 732–33 (footnote omitted). 
 50.  Id. at 727–28. 
 51.  See id. at 738 (finding it “enough to hold” that the claims asserted by the petitioner did 
not violate a norm of CIL sufficiently defined to support a federal remedy under the ATS). 
 52.  Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum Co., 621 F.3d 111, 124 (2d Cir. 2010), cert. granted, 
132 S. Ct. 472 (U.S. Oct. 17, 2011) (No. 10-1491). 
 53.  Id. at 128. 
 54.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 8, at 5 (stating the Second Circuit held, “without 
briefing or argument, that corporations could not be sued under the ATS” and decided no other 
issue). 
 55.  See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 123 (“All defendants are corporate entities—that is, ‘juridical’ 
persons, rather than ‘natural’ persons.”); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1258 (9th ed. 2009) 
(defining a “juridical person,” also termed an “artificial person,” as “an entity, such as a 
corporation, created by law and given certain legal rights and duties of a human being”). 
 56.  See Kiobel, 621 F.3d at 148–49 (finding that “corporate liability has not attained a 
discernable, much less universal, acceptance among nations of the world in their relations” 
sufficient for corporate liability to “form the basis of a suit under the ATS”). 
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not entertain the possibility that it lacked jurisdiction because the 
case presented was foreign-cubed. Instead, much like the circuit 
courts that had adjudicated ATS cases before, the Second Circuit 
assumed it had such jurisdiction. 
Judge Pierre Leval issued a biting concurring opinion in which he 
called the majority’s argument “illogical, internally inconsistent, 
contrary to international law, and incompatible with rulings of both 
the Supreme Court and [the Second Circuit].”57 He asserted that 
international law authorizes all states to adjudicate violations of the 
law of nations, and then leaves it to each state itself to determine how 
to address these violations.58 For example, the Genocide Convention 
simply directs state parties “to enact in accordance with their 
respective Constitutions, the necessary legislation to give effect to the 
provisions of the present Convention.”59 Thus, according to Judge 
Leval, the majority found no directive from international law 
regarding the precise manner in which to adjudicate the violations at 
issue because “[t]he position of international law on whether civil 
liability should be imposed for violations of its norms is that 
international law takes no position.”60 
After a petition for an en banc review was denied by a divided 
vote, Plaintiffs filed for a writ of certiorari, which the Supreme Court 
granted.61 The questions upon which certiorari was granted were: (1) 
whether the issue of corporate civil tort liability under the ATS is a 
merits question or an issue of subject matter jurisdiction, and (2) 
whether corporations are excluded from tort liability for violations of 
the law of nations.62 After hearing oral argument in February 2012, 
however, the Court ordered the parties to submit supplemental 
briefing and that the case be reargued.63 The question presented, upon 
which oral argument was heard, was: “Whether and under what 
circumstances the [ATS] allows courts to recognize a cause of action 
for violations of the law of nations occurring within the territory of a 
 
 57.  Id. at 174 (Leval, J., concurring). 
 58.  See id. at 175 (“Civil liability under the ATS for violation of the law of nations . . . is 
awarded in [American] courts because the law of nations has outlawed certain conduct, leaving 
it to each State [itself] to resolve questions of civil liability.”). 
 59.  Id. at 172 n.28 (quoting Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of the Crime of 
Genocide, art. V, Dec. 9, 1948, S. Exec. Doc. O, 81-1 (1949), 78 U.N.T.S. 277). 
 60.  Id. at 152. 
 61.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 8, at 5. 
 62.  Id. 
 63.  Id. at 6. 
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sovereign other than the United States,”64 an issue the Second Circuit 
did not consider in its own disposition of the case. 
V. ARGUMENTS 
At the second hearing of Kiobel in October 2012, the Supreme 
Court only heard oral argument on the question of whether and 
under what circumstances the ATS grants federal courts jurisdiction 
to recognize a cause of action for an extraterritorial violation of CIL.65 
A. Petitioners’ Argument 
Petitioners contend the ATS does not and should not have a 
categorical territorial limitation. Specifically, they argue such a 
limitation would be contrary to the text and purpose of the statute, 
federal courts have adjudicative jurisdiction to hear these claims, and 
there are sufficient limiting doctrines under which federal courts can 
dismiss inappropriate ATS cases. 
1. The Text and Purpose of the ATS 
Petitioners claim the first Congress “invested the [ATS] with a 
geographic scope commensurate with the reach of the law of nations 
and treaty violations it was enacted to adjudicate.”66 The statute 
contains no express territorial limitation in stark contrast to 
neighboring clauses of the Judiciary Act of 1798.67 Moreover, such a 
limitation would be contrary to the overarching purpose of the ATS—
preventing international tension by ensuring federal courts are 
equipped to handle violations of CIL, such as an attack on an 
ambassador.68 Even if the Marbois Incident had occurred in a foreign 
country, Petitioners argue, the first Congress would have wanted 
federal courts to adjudicate the case, for “[h]arboring the attacker and 
failing to provide a forum to redress such a violation would have 
created precisely the diplomatic problem the ATS was enacted to 
prevent.”69 
 
 64.  Id. 
 65.  Id. 
 66.  Id. at 1. 
 67.  Id. at 21–22 (noting that other provisions are limited with language like “crimes and 
offences . . . committed within their respective districts” (citing Judiciary Act of 1789, ch. 20, § 9, 
1 Stat. 73, 76–77)). 
 68.  Id. at 15–16. 
 69.  Id. at 16. 
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Further, Petitioners claim that in granting federal courts 
jurisdiction over violations of the law of nations, the Founders 
necessarily had in mind extraterritorial transitory torts, which at the 
time could only be heard in state courts.70 The transitory tort doctrine, 
adopted from English common law, provides that a “tortfeasor owe[s] 
an obligation to the victim that [can] be enforced wherever the 
tortfeasor [is] found, regardless of where the tort occurred.”71 
Petitioners assert that a second purpose of the ATS was to “insulate 
such aliens from [the] parochial prejudices of the state courts,” and 
that a categorical territorial limitation on the ATS would have 
accomplished precisely the opposite.72 
Petitioners point to Attorney General William Bradford’s Opinion 
following the Sierra Leone attack as contemporaneous evidence of 
the scope of the statute. In the Opinion, Bradford states definitively 
that the ATS could serve as a vehicle of redress for victims of the 
attack.73 As part of the Sierra Leone attack did take place on shore—
on foreign land—and not solely on the high seas, Petitioners contend 
the Opinion clearly evidences that the ATS authorizes federal courts 
to adjudicate causes of action arising on foreign soil.74 
Although Respondents allege that the statutory canon of 
presumption against extraterritoriality applies to the ATS, a canon 
which states “[w]hen a statute gives no clear indication of an 
extraterritorial application, it has none,”75 Petitioners highlight that 
the presumption does not apply to jurisdictional statutes and that the 
ATS is a jurisdictional statute.76 Application of the presumption to the 
ATS would be illogical because the comity concerns behind the canon 
do not apply—under the ATS, federal courts are enforcing CIL, 
universally recognized international standards of conduct, rather than 
American norms.77 Moreover, even if the presumption did apply, it 
would be easily rebutted by the fact that the ATS was expressly 
intended to enforce the law of nations, which applies 
 
 70.  Id. at 18. 
 71.  Id. at 27. 
 72.  Id. at 19 (citation omitted). 
 73.  Id. at 31–32. 
 74.  Id. at 17. 
 75.  Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2878 (2010). 
 76.  See Brief for Petitioners, supra note 8, at 34 (noting, as an example, that the 
presumption does not apply to the jurisdictional provisions of the Securities Exchange Act but 
does apply to the substantive regulation of conduct prescribed by the Act (citing Morrison, 130 
S. Ct. at 2877 (2010))). 
 77.  Id. at 35. 
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extraterritorially.78 
Finally, Petitioners assert “no court has ever held that the ATS is 
limited to conduct on [American] soil.”79 If Congress were dissatisfied 
with the reach of the ATS as applied in federal courts, it would have 
amended the statute—yet, since Filartiga recognized an 
extraterritorial cause of action under the ATS thirty-two years ago, 
Congress has taken no such action.80 
2. Jurisdiction to Adjudicate and Limiting Doctrines 
Petitioners argue that recognizing extraterritorial causes of action 
under the ATS does not violate international law; rather, it is 
“authorized under international law based on jurisdiction to 
adjudicate.”81 Sosa confirmed that under the ATS, federal courts apply 
international law to adjudicate the parties’ rights, and simply use 
federal common law to “supply the other rules necessary to govern 
the conduct of the litigation.”82 As federal courts hearing ATS claims 
are recognizing violations of universal norms that are substantially 
paralleled the world over, the risk of unduly infringing on a foreign 
nation’s sovereignty and thereby violating international law 
dissipates.83 In addition, because a federal court must first obtain 
personal jurisdiction over the defendant, foreign nations can be 
assured that the United States will have at least some tie to the case 
before it adjudicates the issue.84 Personal jurisdiction stands as the 
threshold barrier in every ATS case, and may serve as a particularly 
high barrier in foreign-cubed cases.85 
Finally, Petitioners assert that existing limiting doctrines, like 
comity, forum non conveniens, and exhaustion of domestic remedies, 
ensure federal courts can dismiss those ATS cases that raise serious 
“concerns about the appropriateness of asserting federal 
 
 78.  Id. at 9. 
 79.  Id. at 8. 
 80.  Id. at 17–18. 
 81.  Id. at 38 (citing RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE 
UNITED STATES § 421 (1987) (noting that a “state may exercise jurisdiction through its courts to 
adjudicate with respect to a person or thing if the relationship of the state to the person or thing 
is such as to make the exercise of jurisdiction reasonable”)). 
 82.  Id. at 39. 
 83.  See id. at 40 (stating that the United States is authorized “to adjudicate ATS claims 
arising abroad . . . [because] customary international human rights norms are erga omnes—
obligations owed to all states”). 
 84.  Id. 
 85.  Id. at 53. 
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jurisdiction.”86 Utilizing limiting doctrines to weed-out untenable ATS 
cases is in line with the Supreme Court’s directive and warning in 
Sosa—and it is a practice that can operate on a case-by-case basis.87 
B. Respondents’ Argument 
Respondents contend that the ATS does not apply 
extraterritorially for the following reasons: (1) Congress did not 
expressly grant this authority in the ATS, and thus the presumption 
against extraterritoriality applies; (2) adjudicating extraterritorial 
causes of action in foreign-cubed cases violates international law; and 
(3) it is necessary to defer to Congress when such important foreign 
policy concerns are at play. 
1. The Presumption Against Extraterritoriality 
Respondents argue that because the ATS does not explicitly 
provide for application of American law to conduct on foreign soil, 
the statutory canon of presumption against extraterritoriality applies. 
In a foreign-cubed ATS case, the presumption is triggered because the 
court applies federal common law to adjudicate an extraterritorial 
cause of action.88 Such an application of the ATS interferes with a 
foreign nation’s ability to independently regulate its affairs, which 
raises comity concerns that the presumption attempts to prevent, and 
which can lead to precisely the type of diplomatic problems the First 
Congress was trying to avoid.89 
Although the ATS extends to piracy on the high seas, 
Respondents claim that the high seas and foreign territory are 
perfectly distinct: “Whereas the territory of a foreign nation is plainly 
within that nation’s sovereign authority,” the high seas is a region 
subject to no sovereign, and thus adjudication of conduct on the high 
seas does not infringe any nation’s sovereignty.90 Moreover, the 
 
 86.  See id. at 52 (“[A]ny concerns . . . are adequately addressed by existing doctrines 
designed to manage such issues in transnational cases); id. at 52 n.43 (“Foreign sovereign 
immunity and the political question and act of state doctrines may apply in some ATS cases 
arising out of conduct on foreign soil.” (citing Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 n.21 
(2004))). 
 87.  See id. at 7 (suggesting that Sosa “specifically endorsed” certain ATS cases arising 
from extraterritorial violations of human rights and that limiting doctrines enable federal courts 
to “implement appropriately the judicial caution indicated by Sosa on a case-specific” basis). 
 88.  Supplemental Brief for Respondents at 12, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-
1491 (U.S. Aug. 1, 2012) [hereinafter Brief for Respondents]. 
 89.  Id. at 2 (citing F. Hoffman-La Roche Ltd. v. Empagran S.A., 542 U.S. 155, 165 (2004)). 
 90.  Id. at 26. 
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Supreme Court has held that “when a statute provides for some 
extraterritorial application, the presumption against extraterritoriality 
operates to limit that provision to its terms.”91 Thus, even if conduct on 
the high seas served as an exception, the presumption would still 
apply to ATS causes of action arising out of conduct on foreign soil.92 
Next, Respondents argue that although the ATS is a jurisdictional 
statute, it is accompanied by a federal common-law lawmaking 
authority and thus is not beyond the reach of the presumption.93 
Respondents claim that this explains seeming anomalies between 
neighboring statutes in the Judiciary Act, some of which contain 
express geographical limitations, and some of which, like the ATS, do 
not.94 The lawmaking feature of the ATS also explains why the ATS is 
not comparable to transitory tort cases under common law: in 
transitory tort cases, “the cause of action is afforded by the law of the 
place of the conduct; the forum state does not append its own cause of 
action to another state’s substantive norm.”95 
2. Charming Betsy and Prescriptive Jurisdiction 
Respondents argue that the ATS does not extend to causes of 
action arising on foreign soil, because to hold otherwise would violate 
international law.96 The rule outlined by the Supreme Court in Murray 
v. Schooner Charming Betsy97 states that “an act of Congress ought 
never to be construed to violate the law of nations if any other 
possible construction remains.”98 Though under the ATS federal 
courts address violations of CIL, in doing so they apply federal 
common law.99 Thus, in recognizing an ATS case with an 
extraterritorial cause of action, federal courts would be imposing 
American law on foreign nations, thereby exercising prescriptive 
jurisdiction rather than adjudicative jurisdiction.100 As outlined in the 
 
 91.  Morrison v. Nat’l Australia Bank Ltd., 130 S. Ct. 2869, 2883 (2010). 
 92.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 88, at 26–27. 
 93.  Id. at 19. 
 94.  Id. at 19–23. 
 95.  Id. at 17. 
 96.  Id. at 38. 
 97.  6 U.S. 64 (1804). 
 98.  Id. at 118. 
 99.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 88, at 38. 
 100.  Id. at 37–39. See F.T.C. v. Compagnie De Saint-Gobain-Pont-a-Mousson, 636. F.2d 
1300, 1315–16 (“International law imposes different limitations upon a state’s exercise of its 
jurisdiction, depending upon whether the jurisdiction exercised is prescriptive or [adjudicative] 
jurisdiction.”). 
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Restatement of Foreign Relations Law, courts can only exercise 
prescriptive jurisdiction with respect to: 
(1)(a) a conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place 
within its territory, (b) the status of persons, or interests in things, 
present within its territory, (c) conduct outside its territory that has 
or is intended to have substantial effect within its territory; (2) the 
activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as 
well as within its territory; and (3) certain conduct outside its 
territory by persons not its nationals that is directed against the 
security of the state or against a limited class of other state 
interests.101 
None of these circumstances is generally applicable in a foreign-
cubed case.102 Recognizing federal-common-law claims under the ATS 
when there is no accepted basis for prescriptive jurisdiction would 
violate international law, and thus would violate the Charming Betsy 
rule.103 
Additionally, Respondents contend that courts do not have 
universal jurisdiction to recognize extraterritorial causes of action 
under the ATS. The Restatement of Foreign Relations Law 
establishes when universal jurisdiction is authorized: 
A state has jurisdiction to define and prescribe punishment for 
certain offenses recognized by the community of nations as of 
universal concern, such as piracy, slave trade, attacks on or 
hijacking of aircraft, genocide, war crimes, and perhaps certain acts 
of terrorism, even where none of the bases of jurisdiction indicated 
in § 402 is present.104 
Respondents note that the Restatement refers only to universal 
criminal jurisdiction, not universal civil jurisdiction.105 In fact, “foreign 
governments and tribunals view the assertion of civil—as opposed to 
criminal—universal jurisdiction as a violation of international law,” 
and therefore a reading of the ATS as granting universal civil 
jurisdiction would also violate the Charming Betsy rule.106 
 
 101.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 
(1987). 
 102.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 88, at 39. 
 103.  Id. at 38. 
 104.  RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 404. 
 105.  Brief for Respondents, supra note 88, at 40. 
 106.  Id. at 40–44. 
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3. Case-Specific Doctrines Administered by Courts versus 
Congressional Line-Drawing 
Respondents emphasize that there is substantial disagreement 
that a private right of action in the United States is the best way to 
implement international human rights.107 Broadening the scope of the 
ATS thus poses significant risks to America’s interests.108 For example, 
the Nigerian government formally protested against the United States 
hearing Kiobel, claiming that adjudication in the United States would 
jeopardize reconciliation attempts by the Nigerian government, 
compromise its efforts to secure foreign investment, undermine the 
nation’s sovereignty, and strain its relationship with the United 
States.109 Additionally, fear of adverse effects from foreign-based ATS 
litigation may encourage corporations to “divest from foreign nations, 
disserving [American] foreign policy interests and harming foreign 
beneficiaries of that investment.”110 
As the potential for international discord is extremely high in 
well-publicized, foreign-cubed ATS cases, Respondents press for a 
rule that would require courts to defer to Congress.111 Respondents 
emphasize that “policy arguments . . . [cannot] supply a substitute for 
Congress’s affirmative expression of will.”112 As Congress has the 
ability to expressly authorize extraterritorial causes of action under 
the ATS, it would be imprudent to broaden the scope of the statute 
without further direction from the Legislature. 
VI. ANALYSIS 
A categorical bar on extraterritorial causes of action under the 
ATS is unwarranted and unnecessary. Contemporaneous evidence, 
such as the Bradford Opinion, demonstrates that the ATS was 
intended to apply extraterritorially and thus the presumption against 
extraterritoriality is inapplicable. Additionally, contrary to 
Respondents’ argument, applying the ATS to extraterritorial causes of 
 
 107.  Id. at 50–51 (noting, as an example, that South Africa prefers to address CIL violations 
under its own law “rather than by relying upon private plaintiffs pursuing redress in [American] 
courts under adversarial [American] procedures”). 
 108.  Id. at 51. 
 109.  Id. at 5. 
 110.  Id. at 52. 
 111.  Id. at 48. 
 112.  Id. 
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action does not violate international law when courts recognize only 
the narrow violations of CIL outlined in Sosa. Even in cases that meet 
the Sosa standard, federal courts can utilize limiting doctrines to 
dismiss claims that may raise serious foreign policy concerns. Finally, 
the ATS serves as an important tool in combatting violations of 
international human rights; without a stronger showing that Congress 
intended to bar extraterritorial claims under the ATS, it would be 
unwarranted to deny aliens with meritorious claims a forum in which 
to litigate. 
A. Contemporaneous Evidence and the Presumption Against 
Extraterritoriality 
The early history of the ATS lends considerable weight to the 
contention that the ATS authorizes federal courts to adjudicate causes 
of action arising abroad. As Justice Story explained in United States v. 
Smith,113 the law of nations was part of the common law.114 A violation 
of the law of nations, such as piracy, was deemed “an offence against 
the universal law of society,” and the pirate “an enemy of the human 
race.”115 With this background, it would have been illogical to 
categorically exclude claims arising on foreign territory when the 
drafters clearly understood that violations of the law of nations occur 
the world over and are violations against all nations alike. In addition, 
the Blackstonian norms that the drafters had in mind when crafting 
the ATS could certainly occur extraterritorially, piracy on the high 
seas being the most obvious example.116 If a CIL violation was 
committed extraterritorially, it would be adverse to the purpose of the 
ATS to allow this violation to go unpunished provided the 
perpetrator was later found in the United States. For instance, 
although the Marbois Incident occurred in Philadelphia, had the 
attacker assailed the ambassador elsewhere and then fled to the 
United States, Petitioners correctly argue that it is unlikely the United 
States would have provided a safe haven—to do so would inspire 
precisely the diplomatic tension the drafters of the ATS sought to 
avoid.117 
 
 113.  18 U.S. 153 (1820). 
 114.  Id. at 161. 
 115.  Id. 
 116.  See id. at 162 (defining piracy as “robbery upon the sea” generally and noting it was 
the practice of all nations to punish “persons, whether natives or foreigners, who ha[d] 
committed this offence against any persons whatsoever”). 
 117.  Brief for Petitioners, supra note 8, at 16. 
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Moreover, the United States may have had an obligation to 
provide a remedy under international law as it stood when the ATS 
was enacted. As Blackstone stated, “where the individuals of any state 
violate this general law [of nations], it is then the interest as well as the 
duty of the government under which they live, to animadvert upon 
them with a becoming severity, that the peace of the world be 
maintained.”118 Echoing similar concerns, the United States, as amicus 
curiae, requested that the Court be guided “by the legislative purpose 
[of the ATS] to permit a tort remedy in federal court for law-of-
nations violations for which the aggrieved foreign nation could hold 
the United States accountable.”119 In fact, the Framers unambiguously 
provided for jurisdiction over cases involving an alien and an 
American citizen under Article III of the Constitution,120 which 
extends the judicial power to “controversies . . . between a State, or 
the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.”121 
Further contemporaneous support that the ATS applies 
extraterritorially rests in Bradford’s Opinion following the Sierra 
Leone attack. Bradford plainly stated that victims of the attack could 
bring suit in American courts under the ATS.122 While Respondents 
suggest Bradford’s opinion might have been directed at allegations of 
misconduct on the high seas alone,123 Bradford was specifically 
responding to complaints that American citizens pillaged and 
destroyed property in Freetown, Sierra Leone.124 We do not know 
whether Bradford would have decided differently had American 
 
 118.  4 WILLIAM BLACKSTONE, COMMENTARIES ON THE LAWS OF ENGLAND 68 (1769) 
(emphasis added). 
 119.  Brief for the United States, supra note 33, at 3. 
 120.  See Bradley, supra note 31, at 522 (explaining that federal courts have jurisdiction 
under Article III of the Constitution to hear a foreign-squared case, but warning that the 
Constitutional basis for hearing foreign-cubed cases “is much less clear, at least when the suits 
involve alleged breaches of the law of nations rather than a treaty”). A “foreign-squared” ATS 
case is one involving “foreign conduct, foreign plaintiffs, but an [American] defendant.” Brief 
for Respondents, supra note 88, at 9. 
 121.  U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2 cl. 1. 
 122.  See 1 Op. Att’y Gen. 57, 59 (finding that victims who had been attacked by American 
citizens overseas had a “remedy by civil suit in the courts of the United States” under the ATS); 
see also Brief for the United States, supra note 33, at 7 (stating that some of the conduct at issue 
in the Bradford Opinion occurred within the territory of Sierra Leone). 
 123.  See Brief for Respondents, supra note 88, at 28 (claiming that Bradford concluded “the 
ATS was available as to conduct on the high seas, not conduct on the soil” of Sierra Leone and 
that the “materials he reviewed in preparing his opinion allege[d] both sorts of conduct”). 
 124.  See Bradley, supra note 31, at 520–21 (finding it unlikely that Bradford had in mind 
only conduct that occurred on the high seas; rather that he “appeared to be endorsing 
extraterritorial application of the statute”); see also supra notes 31–36 and accomanying text. 
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citizens not been the perpetrators, yet his Opinion demonstrates 
rather definitively that a categorical exclusion of extraterritorial 
causes of action would have been inconsistent with his understanding 
of the ATS. 
B. Sosa and Jurisdiction Under the ATS 
In Sosa, the Supreme Court held it would not violate international 
law for federal courts to adjudicate certain violations of CIL.125 Yet, 
the Court failed to address whether a territorial limitation applies to 
the ATS. While the Court emphasized that “Congress intended the 
ATS to furnish jurisdiction for a relatively modest set of actions 
alleging violations of [CIL],”126 the Court made no suggestion that 
extraterritorial causes of action were categorically barred. Rather, in 
an important footnote, the Court stated that it would “certainly 
consider . . . in an appropriate case” an exhaustion limitation, 
requiring a plaintiff to exhaust remedies in the domestic legal system 
before turning to American courts.127 Unless the Court recognized an 
extraterritorial cause of action under the ATS, whether in a foreign-
cubed case or a foreign-squared case, an exhaustion limitation would 
be completely unnecessary.128 Federal courts seem to have interpreted 
the Sosa opinion similarly, as they continue to hear foreign-cubed 
ATS cases.129 
 
 125.  Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 732 (2004) (“[F]ederal courts should not 
recognize private claims under federal common law for violations of any international law norm 
with less definite content and acceptance among civilized nations than the historical 
paradigms . . . .”). 
 126.  Id. at 720. 
 127.  Id. at 733 n.21. 
 128.  Suppose an ATS claim had a single foreign element, such as if one of the parties was a 
resident of the United States and the conduct substantially occurred in the United States. A 
federal court would be authorized to adjudicate the claim under international law because the 
court would have prescriptive jurisdiction. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN 
RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 402 (1987) (“A state has jurisdiction to prescribe 
law with respect to (1)(a) a conduct that, wholly or in substantial part, takes place within its 
territory . . . (2) the activities, interests, status, or relations of its nationals outside as well as 
within its territory . . . .”). Additionally, while an exhaustion requirement is usually imposed to 
afford the state where the violation occurred a chance to redress the violation according to its 
own procedures, Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 680 (7th Cir. 2012), such 
concerns would not be at play in the hypothetical ATS claim posed since the alleged misconduct 
occurred in the United States. Thus an exhaustion limitation would be wholly unnecessary. 
 129.  See, e.g., Sarei v. Rio Tinto, PLC, 671 F.3d 736, 742–46 (9th Cir. 2011) (adjudicating a 
foreign-cubed case in which the plaintiffs were foreign, the defendants were foreign, and the 
alleged misconduct took place in Papua New Guinea); Jean v. Dorelien, 431 F.3d 776, 777–79 
(11th Cir. 2005) (remanding for further proceedings a foreign-cubed case in which plaintiffs 
were Haitian, defendant was a Haitian military official, and the alleged misconduct took place in 
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Ultimately, whether a federal court is violating international law 
will turn on how faithfully the court applies international law.130 As the 
Ninth Circuit explained, the ATS provides “a domestic forum for 
claims based on conduct that is illegal everywhere, including the place 
where the conduct took place”; thus adjudicating a proper ATS claim 
can be “no infringement on the sovereign authority of other 
nations,”131 so long as applicable substantive and procedural hurdles 
are first overcome.132 No federal court has held that adjudicating an 
extraterritorial cause of action under the ATS violates international 
law, though courts often dismiss these claims on other grounds.133 In 
applying the stringent Sosa standard, federal courts have often been 
compelled to dismiss ATS claims for failing to state cognizable 
violations of CIL.134 As recent ATS litigation demonstrates, federal 
courts are more than capable of faithfully applying Sosa and, in so 
doing, diligently examining international law so as to afford aliens a 
forum in which to litigate violations of CIL without overreaching the 
jurisdictional grant of the ATS. 
 
Haiti). 
 130.  See Anthony Colangelo, Response: Adjudicative versus Prescriptive Jurisdiction, 
Translating Historical Intent, and a Brief Universal Jurisdiction Rejoinder, SCOTUSBLOG (July 
20, 2012, 12:50 PM), http://www.scotusblog.com/2012/07/response-adjudicative-versus-
prescriptive-jurisdiction-translating-historical-intent-and-a-brief-universal-jurisdiction-rejoinder 
(explaining that if a court, in adjudicating an ATS claim, applies a “conduct-regulating rule 
[that] faithfully and accurately reflects extant international law,” the court’s “exercise of 
jurisdiction over entirely foreign activity” will not be a violation of international law). 
 131.  Sarei, 671 F.3d at 746. 
 132.  See Sosa, 542 U.S. at 733 n.21 (stating that it may be appropriate to apply principles to 
limit “the availability of relief in the federal courts for violations of [CIL]” but refusing to list 
such principles as the case could be disposed on other grounds). 
 133.  See BETH STEPHENS ET AL., INTERNATIONAL HUMAN RIGHTS LITIGATION IN U.S. 
COURTS 12 (2d ed. 2008) (finding that following Filartiga, approximately 150 lawsuits had been 
filed under the ATS as of late 2006, but “fewer than two dozen cases . . . sustained ATS claims,” 
namely for failure to state a cognizable violation of CIL). 
 134.  See, e.g., Sinaltrainal v. Coca-Cola Co., 578 F.3d 1252, 1258–60 (11th Cir. 2009) (finding 
plaintiffs’ allegations that defendants, in one form or another, cooperated with local authorities 
to rid bottling facilities of unions did not meet the heightened pleading standard required to 
satisfy the ATS after Sosa); Vietnam Ass’n for Victims of Agent Orange v. Dow Chem. Co., 517 
F.3d 104, 123 (2d Cir. 2008) (holding that plaintiffs’ claim that defendants manufactured and 
supplied herbicides laced with poison to be used as defoliants was not a cause of action 
sufficiently defined under CIL to warrant a federal remedy under the ATS); Taveras v. Taveraz, 
477 F.3d 767, 782 (6th Cir. 2006) (dismissing a child abduction case brought under the ATS on 
the ground that parental child abduction did not present a binding norm of CIL giving rise to a 
cause of action under the ATS). 
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C. Adequacy of Limiting Doctrines 
Limiting doctrines like forum non conveniens and the exhaustion 
of domestic remedies can serve to ensure that federal courts dismiss 
cases that pose serious foreign policy concerns.135 For instance, 
following a motion for forum non conveniens, a court must determine 
whether an adequate alternative forum exists and whether the public 
and private interests weigh in favor of dismissal.136 In addition, judges 
may require plaintiffs to exhaust local remedies in the legal system in 
which the claim arose, or to which the claim is connected, before filing 
a claim in federal court. An exhaustion requirement is a “well-
established rule of customary international law,”137 and one with 
“particularly deep roots.”138 Noting as much, the European 
Commission, as amicus curiae, emphasized that before a federal court 
can recognize an extraterritorial cause of action, “international law 
requires exhaustion of local and international remedies.”139 
 
 135.  See Brief for the United States, supra note 33, at 22 (supporting the use of limiting 
doctrines in ATS cases and suggesting that such doctrines “be applied at the outset of the 
litigation and with special force”). 
 136.  Piper Aircraft Co. v. Reyno, 454 U.S. 235, 241 (1981) (noting dismissal may be 
warranted when a forum is inappropriate “because of considerations affecting the court’s own 
administrative and legal problems,” or when the forum proves oppressive and vexatious to the 
defendant (citing Koster v. Lumbermens Mut. Cas. Co., 330 U.S. 518, 524 (1947))). 
 137.  Interhandel (Switz v. U.S.), Preliminary Objections, 1959 I.C.J. 6, 27 (Mar. 21); see 
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF FOREIGN RELATIONS LAW OF THE UNITED STATES § 713 cmt. f 
(1987) (“Under international law, ordinarily a state is not required to consider a claim by 
another state for an injury to its national until that person has exhausted domestic 
remedies . . . .”). 
 138.  Matthew S. Duchesne, The Continuous-Nationality-of-Claims Principle: Its Historical 
Development and Current Relevance to Investor-State Investment Disputes, 36 GEO. WASH. 
INT’L L. REV. 783, 788 n.24 (2004) (noting that the exhaustion of local remedies rule “can be 
found in treaties dating back as far as the ninth century”). Today, a number of international 
treaties do in fact have an exhaustion requirement. See, e.g., International Covenant on Civil 
and Political Rights, art. 41(1)(c), opened for signature Dec. 16, 1966, 999 U.N.T.S. 171 
(imposing an exhaustion limitation on potential petitioners); Organization of American States, 
American Convention on Human Rights, art. 46, Nov. 22, 1969, 1144 U.N.T.S. 123 (same); 
European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms, art. 
35(1), Nov. 4, 1950, 213 U.N.T.S. 221 (same). 
 139.  Brief of the European Commission on Behalf of the European Union as Amicus 
Curiae in Support of Neither Party at 30, Kiobel v. Royal Dutch Petroleum, No. 10-1491 (U.S. 
June 12, 2012) (emphasis added). The United States has itself invoked the exhaustion 
requirement as a defense in a case before the International Court of Justice; it sought a finding 
that the court had no jurisdiction to hear the matters raised on the ground that “Interhandel, 
whose case Switzerland [was] espousing, ha[d] not exhausted the local remedies available to it in 
the United States courts.” Interhandel, 1959 I.C.J. at 26; see The Interhandel Case: Switzerland v. 
United States, 1960 DUKE L.J. 73, 73–74 (noting that Interhandel involved a claim by the Swiss 
Government seeking “restitution of assets of its national, Interhandel, which had been vested in 
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Though the Court in Sosa did not determine whether an 
exhaustion requirement applies to the ATS, it did state that it would 
“certainly consider” applying an exhaustion limitation “in an 
appropriate case.”140 Reading an exhaustion requirement into the ATS 
would be in line with precedent, as the Court previously held that 
“where Congress has not clearly required exhaustion, sound judicial 
discretion governs.”141 Additionally, an exhaustion limitation would be 
fully consistent with the overall goals of the ATS. By permitting a 
country with closer ties to the tort to first decide whether it will 
adjudicate the claim, a federal court can ensure it is not unduly 
infringing on another nation’s sovereignty while still ensuring that 
violations of CIL do not go remediless.142 Furnished with such limiting 
doctrines, federal courts adjudicating extraterritorial violations of CIL 
can adequately mitigate potential foreign policy concerns. 
D. Implications of a Categorical Territorial Bar 
To bar extraterritorial claims under the ATS would be to deny 
otherwise proper litigants, with meritorious claims, a forum in which 
to litigate. Though Congress supplemented the ATS by enacting the 
Torture Victim Protection Act (TVPA) in 1991,143 Congress stated 
clearly that neither the TVPA nor any other statute performs a 
comparable function to the ATS.144 Whereas the ATS extends to “any 
civil action by an alien for a tort” that violates CIL or a treaty of the 
United States,145 the TVPA is limited to torture and extrajudicial 
killings committed under actual or apparent authority, or color of law 
“of any foreign nation.”146 In addition, while victims of international 
 
the United States during World War II” on the ground that the assets were enemy property). 
 140.  See Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain, 542 U.S. 692, 733 n.21 (2004) (highlighting that the 
“requirement of clear definition is not meant to be the only principle limiting the availability of 
relief in the federal courts for violations of [CIL]”). 
 141.  McCarthy v. Madigan, 503 U.S. 140, 144 (1992) (internal citations omitted). 
 142.  See Abelesz v. Magyar Nemzeti Bank, 692 F.3d 661, 680 (7th Cir. 2012) (stating that an 
exhaustion requirement is “based on the idea that the state where the alleged violation occurred 
should have an opportunity to redress it by its own means, within the framework of its own legal 
system”). 
 143.  Pub. L. No. 102-256, 106 Stat. 73 (1992) (codified at 28 U.S.C. § 1350 note (2000)). 
 144.  See S. Rep. No. 102-249, at 4–5 (1991) (noting that the ATS has “important uses” not 
covered under the TVPA, and thus that the ATS “should not be replaced”); H.R. Rep. No. 102-
367, at 4 (1991), reprinted in 1992 U.S.C.C.A.N. at 86 (finding that “claims based on torture and 
summary executions do not exhaust the list of actions that may appropriately be covered” under 
the ATS and thus that the ATS “should remain intact to permit suits based on other norms that 
already exist or may ripen in the future into rules of [CIL]”). 
 145.  28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 (West 2012). 
 146.  TVPA § 2(a), 28 U.S.C.A. § 1350 note (West 2012). The TVPA is further limited as it 
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human rights violations could petition international tribunals, there 
are several reasons why these tribunals may prove inadequate. The 
scope of review may be far more limited than that in American 
courts,147 and international tribunals do not generally issue legally 
binding decisions.148 Recognizing Congress’s recent affirmance of the 
statute and the unavailability of alternative forums for many potential 
ATS plaintiffs, it would be contrary to the intentions of the 
Legislature to severely damper the ATS by implementing a 
categorical exclusion on extraterritorial causes of action. 
Additionally, ATS litigation serves as an important instrument in 
the ongoing effort to eradicate human rights abuses around the world. 
As one scholar notes, ATS litigation operates as “an international 
check against domestic impunity,” signaling that America will not 
serve as a shelter for dictators and their followers and that human 
rights violations will not go remediless.149 In fact, America’s “general 
abhorrence of erroneously denying meritorious constitutional claims” 
has supported broad exceptions in other areas of American law, even 
at the sacrifice of such principles as finality in judgments.150 Thus, 
granted the important function of the ATS, and the country’s disfavor 
of erroneously denying meritorious claims, it would seem inapposite 
to annihilate extraterritorial claims as a class without further direction 
from Congress. 
In light of the contemporaneous evidence demonstrating that the 
ATS was intended to apply extraterritorially, the narrowing of 
actionable violations of CIL under Sosa, the adequacy of existing 
 
sets out a definition of “torture” and “extrajudicial killing,” id. § 3, and it imposes both a statute 
of limitations and an exhaustion requirement, id. § 2(b)–(c). 
 147.  See Laurence R. Helfer, Forum Shopping for Human Rights, 148 U. PA. L. REV. 285, 
301 (1999) (“Unlike [American] federal law, there is no supreme arbiter of international human 
rights law . . . each court or tribunal operates as the sole interpreter of the agreement that 
created it, with no formal mechanisms available to interact with its counterparts in other treaty 
systems.”). 
 148.  See id. at 348 (“Unlike [American] domestic law, where judgments of both state and 
federal courts are enforceable against the losing party, not all human rights tribunals can issue 
legally binding decisions (as contrasted with recommendations for remedial action).”); id. at 
303–04 (explaining that the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) is unique in its ability to 
issue legally binding rulings, but noting that the ECHR “also imposes stringent procedural 
hurdles that result in the dismissal of the overwhelming majority of cases prior to a hearing on 
the merits”). 
 149.  Emeka Duruigbo, Exhaustion of Local Remedies in Alien Tort Litigation: Implications 
for International Human Rights Protection, 29 FORDHAM INT’L L.J. 1245, 1289 (2006). 
 150.  See Helfer, supra note 147, at 347 (noting that a fear of denying meritorious 
constitutional claims is a primary force behind the exceptions to finality rooted in American 
habeas corpus law). 
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limiting doctrines, and the important function the ATS serves, the 
Court should hold that the ATS can apply extraterritorially. 
VII. CONCLUSION 
Petitioners correctly argue that a categorical bar on 
extraterritorial causes of action under the ATS is unwarranted and ill-
advised. The ATS was intended to apply extraterritorially, as 
evidenced by the events that precipitated the Judiciary Act of 1789, 
Congress’s purpose in enacting the statute, and Attorney General 
William Bradford’s Opinion concerning its application; thus the 
presumption against extraterritoriality does not apply here. Likewise, 
the Charming Betsy rule does not stand as a bar because applying the 
ATS to extraterritorial causes of action does not alone violate 
international law, provided courts only recognize the narrow 
violations of CIL outlined in Sosa. Moreover, existing limiting 
doctrines can be utilized to dismiss inappropriate ATS cases, thereby 
mitigating the comity concerns an extraterritorial application may 
otherwise raise. Finally, the ATS performs an important function in 
remedying egregious violations of international human rights. To deny 
plaintiffs a forum in which to litigate through a categorical bar on 
extraterritorial causes of action under the ATS, without a stronger 
showing that such is what Congress intended, would be misguided. 
 
